Cybercriminal groups are increasingly abusing a dangerous feedback loop in which infostealer malware enables attackers to hijack legitimate business websites and convert them into active malware distribution platforms.
Recent threat intelligence research shows that attackers are leveraging credentials stolen by infostealer malware to gain unauthorized access to real company websites. Once inside, they inject malicious scripts that are later used to deliver additional malware to unsuspecting visitors.
This approach allows threat actors to weaponize trusted digital infrastructure without registering new domains or purchasing hosting services, significantly reducing both cost and traceability.
How ClickFix Attacks Work
A key technique used in these campaigns is known as ClickFix, a social engineering method designed to trick users into executing malicious commands themselves.
ClickFix lures typically impersonate familiar system elements such as CAPTCHA checks, browser updates, or security verification prompts. When a user interacts with the fake interface, a malicious command is silently copied to their clipboard.
Victims are then instructed to paste and run this command using the Windows Run dialog. Because the user initiates the action manually, traditional endpoint protections and browser-based security controls are often bypassed.
Legitimate Businesses Becoming Attack Vectors
Threat intelligence analysis of ClickFix infrastructure reveals a troubling trend: a significant portion of active malicious domains are not criminally registered sites, but compromised legitimate business websites.
In many cases, administrative credentials for content management systems, hosting dashboards, or website backends were previously harvested by infostealer malware from infected employee devices. Attackers later reused those credentials to access the sites and upload malicious ClickFix scripts.
As a result, victims of credential theft unknowingly become vectors for future attacks, hosting malware campaigns that target new users and organizations.
Why Compromised Legitimate Domains Are Effective
Using real business websites provides attackers with several strategic advantages:
- Established domains often carry strong trust reputations with users and security systems
- Traffic filters are less likely to block known, long-standing websites
- The infrastructure appears legitimate, increasing the success rate of social engineering
- Attackers avoid creating new digital footprints that could expose their operations
This shift reflects an evolution in cybercrime economics, where attackers favor hijacking existing infrastructure rather than building their own.
The Self-Perpetuating Infostealer Cycle
The attack chain forms a continuous loop:
- Infostealers infect user systems and collect credentials
- Stolen credentials grant access to legitimate websites
- Malicious code is injected into trusted domains
- Compromised sites distribute new infostealers
- Newly infected users supply more credentials
Breaking this cycle is increasingly difficult once multiple organizations are involved.
Detection and Defensive Measures
Security researchers, including teams at Hudson Rock, have highlighted the need for early detection of credential exposure and unauthorized website access.
Recommended defensive measures include:
- Enforcing multi-factor authentication on all administrative accounts
- Conducting regular credential audits and access reviews
- Monitoring website file integrity and backend changes
- Training employees to recognize social engineering tactics
- Scanning for signs that credentials may have appeared in infostealer datasets
A Growing Risk for Organizations
This trend underscores a critical weakness in modern cybersecurity: technical defenses alone are insufficient when attackers exploit human behavior and credential reuse.
As infostealers continue to evolve and scale, organizations must adopt proactive security strategies that address both infrastructure protection and user awareness. Without intervention, compromised websites will continue to fuel a self-sustaining ecosystem of malware distribution.
Breaking the victim-to-vector cycle is no longer optional. It is a core requirement for defending today’s digital infrastructure.
